How A Luftwaffe Ace Predicted Germany’s Defeat 10 Months Before D Day…?

August 17th, 1943, 0930 hours. Reckland test center 90 km north of Berlin. Oberloitand Hans Yakim Yabs stood on the tarmac staring at the ugliest aircraft he’d ever seen. The captured American P38 Lightning sat under armed guard. Twin booms, twin engines. A central NL that looked like it had been designed by committee.

Everything about it violated German aesthetic principles of aircraft design. Jabs had been summoned from 4th of November. NJG1 won 3 days earlier. The order came directly from Luftwafa High Command. Combat pilot perspective required. Reclin engineers need operational assessment. He didn’t understand why they needed a night fighter pilot to evaluate a day fighter.

He didn’t understand why this particular aircraft warranted such urgency. But as he walked closer, as the morning sun reflected off the twin Allison engines, Jabs felt something he hadn’t experienced in 50 combat victories. Unease. Not from the aircraft itself, from what it represented, something the Reclan engineers were about to show him.

Something that would make him understand why Reich Marshall Guring had personally ordered this evaluation kept classified. 3 days earlier, August 14th, 1943, 2215 hours, IV/NJG1 operations room, Lunberg. Jabs had just returned from a night intercept mission. Two RAF Lancasters confirmed destroyed over Hamburg.

His 49th and 50th victories. The teletype message was waiting. Oblt jabs report. Reclin test center zero 816. August stop. Luftvafa. High command priority. Stop combat evaluation. captured enemy aircraft. Stop. His staff Capitan looked concerned. They’re pulling you off operations for aircraft evaluation. Jabs didn’t answer.

In two years of combat, he’d never been summoned to Recklin. Test pilots evaluated captured aircraft. Engineers wrote technical reports. Combat pilots flew missions. This was irregular. The next morning, Jabs flew a Jew 52 transport to Reclan. The facility sprawled across 400 hectares. hangers, test ranges, wind tunnels, laboratories, Germany’s primary aircraft testing center.

He was met by Hedman Klaus Becker, senior technical officer. Becker’s first words. Obeloidnant, what we’re about to show you is classified Gahima Commando Satcha. You will discuss this evaluation with no one outside this facility. They walked past rows of captured Allied aircraft, Spitfires, P47 Thunderbolts, B7 bombers, all bearing Luftwafa test markings.

Then Becker stopped in front of hangar 7. The P38 Lightning captured intact in March after emergency landing in occupied France. We’ve conducted 47 hours of ground testing and 12 hours of flight testing. Becker’s expression was grim. Reichs Marshall Guring wants operational assessment from combat pilots, specifically pilots with twin engine experience.

Jabs had 800 hours in the BF-110, Germany’s twin engine heavy fighter. He understood why they’d chosen him. What he didn’t understand was why Becker looked like he was delivering a death sentence. 9:45 hours, hanger 7. The P38 sat under flood lights. Becker handed Jabs a technical dossier. We’ll walk through the aircraft systematically.

I want your assessment as a combat pilot, not an engineer. Jabs circled the lightning slowly. Twin Allison V1710 engines, 1,475 horsepower each. Liquid cooled 12cylinder. Counterrotating propellers to eliminate torque. The twin boom design looked ungainainely. The central nel cockpit armament nose wheel seemed like an afterthought.

Your first impression? Becker asked. Ugly, Jab said flatly. Asymmetric visibility. The booms create blind spots. In a dog fight, a BF109 would exploit those angles. Becker nodded. That was our initial assessment, but keep examining. Jabs climbed onto the wing. The construction was different.

Flush rivets, smooth skin, no visible gaps or irregularities. He ran his hand along the engine cowling. The tolerances are tight. Tighter than anything we’re producing. Precision interchangeable parts, Becker said. Every component manufactured to identical specifications. No hand fitting required during assembly. Jabs had watched BF11s being assembled at Gotha.

Skilled workers handfitted panels, adjusted tolerances, filed edges. Every aircraft was slightly different. This P38 looked like it had been stamped out by a machine. The armament? Jabs asked. Becker led him to the nose. 120 mm Hispano cannon 450 caliber Browning machine guns all nosemounted concentrated firepower no convergence issues like wing-mounted guns jabs understood immediately German fighters mounted guns in the wings MG151/20 cannons MG131 machine guns pilots had to calculate convergence distance fire too close or too far and half your rounds

missed the P38’s nose armament eliminated ated that problem. Point and shoot combat effectiveness? Jabs asked. Devastating at close range, Becker said. But that’s not what concerns us. He gestured toward the engines. We need to show you something. Come. 10:30 hours. Engine test cell. One of the P38’s Allison V1710 engines sat mounted on a test stand.

Reckland engineers had disassembled it completely. Every component labeled, measured, analyzed. Becker handed Jabs a technical report. Read the flight test summary. Page seven. Jabs scanned the document. His eyes stopped on one paragraph. Test pilot Litnant Verer Hoffman conducted single engine failure simulation at 6,000 m altitude.

Right engine shutdown completely. Aircraft maintained level flight. No significant loss of control authority. Pilot reported aircraft surprisingly manageable on single engine. Jabs looked up. This flew on one engine for 90 minutes. Becker said Hoffman flew a complete circuit, climbed to 7,000 m, conducted combat maneuvers, landed normally on one engine.

For Jabs, this meant everything. The BF-110, his aircraft, his 800 hours of experience, was a death trap with single engine failure, asymmetric thrust, uncontrollable yaw. Pilots bailed out rather than attempt single engine landing. He’d lost three squadron mates to engine failures. Good pilots, experienced dead because the BF-110 couldn’t fly on one engine.

How? Jabs asked. Becker walked him through the engineering. Counterrotating propellers eliminate torque asymmetry. The twin boom design distributes weight symmetrically. Massive vertical stabilizers provide directional stability. And look at this. He pointed to the engine mount. The engines are mounted close to the fuselage center line. Minimal moment arm.

When one engine fails, the yaw force is manageable. Jab stared at the disassembled engine. Every component was identical to its counterpart, interchangeable, standardized. The BF110 has handfitted engine mounts. Jab said quietly. Every aircraft is different. Asymmetric weight distribution. When an engine fails, he didn’t finish the sentence. Becker nodded.

The Americans designed redundancy into the airframe. We designed performance. They assumed engines would fail. We assumed they wouldn’t. In that moment, Jabs realized something profound. This wasn’t about individual aircraft performance. This was about design philosophy. German engineering optimized for peak performance.

American engineering optimized for survival. And in combat, survival mattered more than speed. 11:45 hours. Reclan briefing room. Becker spread maps across the table. The P-38’s combat radius, Becker said, pointing to the technical specifications. With drop tanks, 650 mi, without 450 mi. Jab studied the numbers.

Then he looked at the map. 650 mi from England covered all of occupied France, all of Belgium, half of Germany. That’s triple our best fighter range, Jab said. Correct, Becca replied. The BF109G has 350 mi range with drop tank. The FW190A 320 mi. The BF-110G 450 mi maximum. Becca drew circles on the map.

This is what American P38s can do from English bases. They can escort bombers to Berlin. They can escort bombers to Munich. They can escort bombers anywhere in the Reich. For Jabs, this meant his entire tactical doctrine was obsolete. German fighter tactics relied on bombers being unescorted. Intercept them beyond escort range. Attack from altitude.

Break off before escorts arrive. If American fighters could escort bombers to any target in Germany, there was no beyond escort range. How? Jabs asked. The fuel capacity. Becker pulled out fuel system diagrams. The P38 carries 410 gal internal fuel with two 150gal drop tanks, 710 g total. The Allison engines are remarkably fuel efficient at cruise power. Specific fuel consumption of 0.

48 lb per horsepower hour. He did the math on a chalkboard. At 25,000 ft, cruise power 1,200 RPM, the P38 burns 80 gall. That’s 8.8 hours endurance with drop tanks. At 290 mph cruise speed, that’s 2550 mi maximum range. Combat radius accounting for combat power reserves tactical maneuvering 650 mi. Jabs compared this to the BF109G.

Our fighters carry 88 g internal with 66gal drop tank, 154 g total. The DB605 engine burns 72 gall at cruise. That’s 2.1 hours endurance at 280 mph, 590 mi maximum range. Combat radius 350 mi. The numbers were devastating. The P-38 had 4.6 times the fuel capacity of a BF-109, nearly triple the combat radius, and it carried that fuel in a twin engine airframe that could survive single engine failure.

What happens when they start escorting bomber formations to Berlin? Jabs asked. Becker’s expression was grim. We calculated that scenario. If 100 P38s escort a bomber formation, and we scramble 200 BF 109s to intercept, our fighters have 15 minutes of combat time before they must break off for fuel. The P-38s can stay over the target for 90 minutes.

He drew engagement timelines on the board. Our pilots attack, expend ammunition, break off. The P-38s remain. Fresh German fighters scramble, engage, break off. The P-38s remain. By the time the bombers egress, our fighters are grounded for refueling. Jabs understood the mathematics of attrition. They don’t need to shoot us down.

They just need to outlast us. Exactly. Becker said, “And this,” he tapped the P38 technical drawing is only one of their long range fighters. “Intelligence reports the Americans are developing the P-51 Mustang with even greater range.” For Jabs, this meant something he’d never considered in 50 combat victories. Germany could win every tactical engagement and still lose the strategic war,400 hours.

Recklin industrial analysis section. Becker led jabs into a secured room, tables covered with production reports, intelligence summaries, reconnaissance photographs. What I’m about to show you is classified at the highest level, Becker said. Reich’s Minister Spear’s office compiled this data from multiple intelligence sources.

He opened a folder marked Gueheim US aircraft production 1943. The Americans produced 10,37 P38 Lightnings between 1941 and now. Current production rate approximately 200 per month at Loheed’s Burbank facility. Jabs did the mental arithmetic. That’s 2,400 per year. Correct. Now compare that to German twin engine fighter production.

Becker pulled out Luftwaffer production reports. We’re producing approximately 150 BF-110s per month, 1,800 per year. The ratio was concerning, but not catastrophic. So, they’re outproducing us, but not overwhelmingly. Becker’s expression darkened. That’s just the P38. Now add the P47 Thunderbolt. Republic Aviation is producing 350 per month.

The P-51 Mustang. North American Aviation is ramping up to 400 per month. The P40 Warhawk. Curtis is still producing 200 per month. He wrote the numbers on a chalkboard. American fighter production August 1943. P38 Lightning 200 per month. P47 Thunderbolt 350 per month. P-51 Mustang 400 projected per month. P40 Warhawk 200 per month.

Total 1,150 fighters per month. German fighter production August 1943. BF- 10009 approximately 1,000 per month. FW190 approximately 450 per month. BF-110 approximately 150 per month. Total 1,600 fighters per month. Jabs studied the numbers. We’re still out producing them. In fighters, yes, Becker said, but look at the engine production.

He pulled out another report. The P38 uses Allison V1710 engines. Allison’s Indianapolis plant is producing these engines for multiple aircraft types. P38s, P40, P39s, P63s. Becker pointed to reconnaissance photographs of American factories, but the P47 Thunderbolt uses a different engine entirely. The Pratt and Whitney R 28000 double WASP, 18 cylinder, air cooled radial, 2,800 cubic in displacement, 2,000 horsepower.

He showed Jabs the production data. Pratt and Whitney is producing R2800 engines at multiple facilities, East Hartford, Kansas City. Combined output over 2,000 engines per month. For JABS, this was when the true scale became apparent. They’re not just building more aircraft. Jab said slowly. They’re building redundant production capacity, multiple engine types, multiple manufacturers.

If we bomb one factory, 10 others continue production. Becker finished. And here’s what truly concerns Reich’s Minister Spear. He pulled out the final document. Photographs of American factories, vast assembly halls. Production lines stretching hundreds of meters. This is Willow Run, Ford Motor Company’s bomber plant in Michigan.

one B-24 Liberator bomber every 63 minutes. This is Boeing’s Seattle facility producing B17 flying fortresses at similar rates. Becker showed photograph after photograph. Consolidated aircraft in San Diego, Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach, North American Aviation in Kansas City, Lockheed in Burbank.

The Americans aren’t just out producing us in aircraft, Becca said quietly. They’re out producing us in industrial capacity by an order of magnitude we cannot match. He showed Jabs one final photograph, an aerial reconnaissance image of the Willowrun plant. This single factory, one factory, is larger than all of Messid’s production facilities combined, and the Americans have dozens of factories this size.

In that moment, Jabs understood what Becca had been leading him toward all day. This wasn’t an evaluation of a captured aircraft. This was an evaluation of whether Germany could win an industrial war against America. And the answer was already calculated. 1630 hours. Reckland test center tarmac.

Jab stood alone beside the P38 lightning. The afternoon sun cast long shadows across the twin booms. He thought about the numbers Becker had shown him. American production 1,150 fighters per month. 13,800 per year. German production 1,600 fighters per month. 19,200 per year. On paper, Germany was winning the production war.

But Jabs understood what the numbers didn’t show. German production required skilled workers, hand fitting components, custom adjustments, every aircraft slightly different. Production bottlenecked by craftsmanship. American production used interchangeable parts, unskilled workers, assembly line processes, production bottlenecked only by raw materials, and America had unlimited raw materials.

He thought about the P38’s redundancy. Twin engines, counterrotating propellers, asymmetric thrust compensation designed assuming engines would fail. German fighters were designed assuming engines wouldn’t fail. Optimized for performance, not survival. He thought about the 650 mi combat radius. American fighters that could escort bombers anywhere in the Reich.

German fighters with 350 mile radius forced to break off engagement for fuel while American escorts remained over the target. He thought about the R2800 engine, 2,000 horsepower mass-produced at 2,000 units per month. The DB605 engine, 1,475 horsepower, produced at 1500 units per month, each requiring skilled engine builders.

The mathematics were inescapable. Germany was fighting a war of quality against quantity and quantity had its own quality. Jabs had 50 confirmed victories. He was an ace, one of the Luftwaffer’s best. But if America could produce 10 fighters for everyone he shot down, his skill was irrelevant. If American fighters could stay over the target for 90 minutes, while German fighters had 15 minutes of combat time, tactics were irrelevant.

If American bombers could strike any target in Germany with fighter escort, air defense was impossible. A staff car approached. Becker stepped out. Your assessment oeloidant. Jabs was silent for a long moment. The P38 is an ugly aircraft, he finally said. Asymmetric visibility, ungainainely design. A BF 109 pilot with good tactics can exploit its weaknesses.

He paused. But that’s not what matters. What matters is that the Americans can produce 200 of these per month. What matters is that they designed it to survive engine failures that would kill a BF-110 pilot. What matters is that they can escort bombers to any target in the Reich. He turned to face Becker. What matters is that we’re fighting an enemy that doesn’t need to build better aircraft.

They just need to build more aircraft and they can build more aircraft than we can shoot down. Becker nodded slowly. That’s the assessment Reich’s Marshall Garing needed to hear from a combat pilot. Will it change anything? Jabs asked. Becker’s expression was answer enough. 3 days later, Jabs returned to IV/NJG1. He flew 47 more combat missions.

He achieved 28 more confirmed victories, bringing his total to 78. He survived the war. But on August 17th, 1943, standing beside that ugly American fighter on the Recklin tarmac, Hans Yoakim Jabs understood something that no amount of tactical skill or individual courage could change. Germany had already lost. Thanks for watching.

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