America Was Shocked by Hitler’s Plan to Bomb New York With Super-Bomber…

Germany entered the war with an air force built mainly for operations close to the front and the Luftvafa spent its early years focused on supporting ground forces rather than building very large long-range bombers. Once the United States joined the conflict, German planners grew increasingly aware of the industrial power that lay across the Atlantic and of the steady flow of weapons, ships, and aircraft that US factories could send to Europe. And this concern led them to consider a very different kind of aircraft. one that could reach North America and strike key targets far from the battlefields of Europe. The America bomber mission was therefore framed as a clear technical and political objective.

The aircraft had to be capable of flying a round trip of roughly 7,200 mi or about 11,600 km from a European or nearby forward base to the US east coast and back. It had to carry a combat payload large enough to damage major industrial or urban targets. And it had to do so with enough reliability that crews could survive the long flight and return to base.

But before we continue, if you want to hear more incredible and untold stories from the history, make sure to like the video and hit the subscribe button and tell me in the comments what country you’re watching from. It’s really fascinating to see how far these forgotten stories can reach. All right. The planners set a target bomb load figure in the order of 4,000 kg, which is about 8,800 lb, because they believe that a payload of that size would allow a single aircraft to deliver significant damage to factories, port installations, or selected city targets. To make such missions feasible in practice, the

program also defined a set of operational objectives beyond raw range and payload. These objectives included improving engine reliability and fuel efficiency so the aircraft could carry the large fuel loads needed for trans ocean endurance, developing navigation systems and crew procedures for long overwater flights where weather and errors could be fatal, and securing or using forward staging points such as Atlantic islands to shorten one-way distance and reduce risk. Planners discussed options ranging from return missions flown all the way back to

friendly bases to one-way attacks supported by recovery plans. But the official requirement focused on a true roundtrip capability since that would demonstrate both reach and operational sustainability. The mission carried both military and political weight because leaders expected a transatlantic bomber to have effects beyond physical damage.

A successful strike on a major American city would aim to change public perceptions and force a shift in American military priorities. And it would serve as a propaganda tool to show that Germany could project power to distant shores. Achieving the mission promised to reshape strategic calculations.

But it also demanded solving a long list of technical and logistical problems that German industry and wartime logistics faced at the time. From the start, the America bomber idea pushed German designers to ask harsh questions about engines structure, fuel fraction, crew endurance, and navigation.

And each new design attempt had to be measured against the core metrics of range and the ability to operate without fighter escort across wide ocean areas, which made the mission both ambitious and technically exceptional for the period. Building an airplane on paper is one thing, and making it fly long over open ocean with a heavy bomb load is another.

And the America bomber program ran into both technical limits and strategic realities that Germany could not overcome in time. The basic numbers that defined the problem were stark. A round trip in the order of 7,200 mi with a combat payload on the order of 4,000 kg required an aircraft that could carry enormous amounts of fuel, stay reliable for many hours of continuous flight, and still leave weight and space for crew, defensive guns, and navigation equipment. And each of those needs pulled the design in a different direction. The fuel problem alone

created a chain of trade-offs that the engineers found hard to solve because adding fuel increases takeoff weight which requires stronger structure and more powerful engines and both of those increase fuel consumption as well to reach transatlantic distances while also carrying tons of bombs.

Any candidate design needed to dedicate a very large fraction of its takeoff weight to fuel which in turn meant big demands on runway length, landing weight and engine reliability. Engines of the era were improving, but they were not miracles. They offered more power at the cost of greater fuel burn and required careful maintenance.

And Germany faced limits in producing large numbers of very high power engines that would also run reliably for the many hours such missions demanded. Navigation and crew endurance were another set of hard problems. Flying across hundreds or thousands of miles of featureless ocean required precise navigation to avoid getting lost.

And the tools available at the time, dead reckoning, celestial fixes, drift measurements, radio signals, when available, were far less forgiving than modern systems. A navigation error over the Atlantic could mean running out of fuel with no safe place to land.

So any practical mission needed redundant navigation aids, trained navigators, reliable radio beacons or staging points, and crews prepared for extreme fatigue on flights that could last well over a day in total mission time. The human factor mattered as much as the metal. Crews had to operate engines, check systems, manage fuel, and defend the aircraft while suffering sleep loss and exposure to cold at high altitude.

Defensive and operational vulnerability made the risk even greater. An enormously heavy bomber flying slowly at long range presented easy targeting for any competent fighter or shipboard anti-aircraft if the aircraft came within interception range and there was no practical way for Germany to provide continuous fighter escort across the ocean.

This vulnerability meant that planners hoped to use forward bases to shorten the ocean leg, but those forward bases were themselves a strategic problem. The only realistic stepping stones in range were island bases such as the Azor, and securing or even using those islands required naval and air control of the sealanes that Germany no longer possessed by 1943 and 1944. So the political and military reality made the ideal operational concept infeasible.

Industrial limits and allied pressure added a final layer of constraint. By the time serious prototype work began, German industry was under sustained Allied bombing, cutting production capacity for airframes, engines, and precision components and raw materials like high-grade aluminum and high octane fuel were increasingly scarce.

The Luftvafer itself shifted priorities as the war changed. Resources were redirected toward fighters, night fighters, and anti-air defenses to meet an immediate threat at home, and programs that required long development time and large material inputs, including heavy strategic bombers, were downgraded or cancelled.

The net effect was that even promising prototypes, could not be followed by mass production, because the workshops, factories, and supply chains were simply unable to scale them up under wartime pressure. Finally, if the America bomber problem is considered alongside the separate German effort to build an atomic weapon, another technical barrier appears, a strategic bomber capable of delivering a nuclear device would still have needed a reliable weapon of the appropriate size and a delivery doctrine. And Germany never had both a tested compact device and a secure, repeatable method of

delivery before 1945. Taken together, the hurdles of fuel, engines, navigation, crew endurance, defensive vulnerability, forward-based politics, industrial capacity, and shifting priorities created a set of interlocking problems that made a sustained operational transatlantic bombing campaign technically imaginable on paper, but strategically and industrially unattainable for Germany in the time available.

By 1944, Germany’s ambitions for the America bomber intersected with another secret project, the development of atomic weapons. German scientists led by physicists like Vera Heisenberg were researching nuclear fision and attempting to build a bomb, although they never succeeded in creating a deliverable device. Despite this, planners in the Luftvafa imagined a scenario in which a long range bomber could carry a nuclear weapon across the Atlantic and strike us.

This possibility was theoretical, but it highlighted why the America bomber was considered more than just a conventional aircraft project. The basic concept was simple in theory. If a bomber could carry around 4,000 kg of bombs over a distance of roughly 7,200 m and return safely, it could in principle carry a nuclear device once one was developed.

At the time, the bomb designs being studied in Germany were still very large and heavy compared with the American Manhattan project devices, which meant that only the heaviest bomber designs such as the six engine Junkers Jaw 390 or projected Hanklh277 could have been candidates for nuclear delivery. However, there were multiple practical barriers.

Germany had not developed a compact functioning nuclear device. So even if the America bomber had reached operational status, there would have been no bomb to load. Additionally, the bomber designs themselves had severe limitations in range, reliability, and defensive capability, which would have made a transatlantic strike extremely risky.

Long flights over open ocean without fighter escort, plus the potential for mechanical failure, meant that even conventional bomb missions were dangerous. Adding a nuclear payload would have increased the stakes without solving the underlying technical challenges.

Despite these problems, the nuclear angle added urgency to the America bomber program in the eyes of some German planners. They understood that if they could combine a long range strategic bomber with a nuclear weapon, the psychological and strategic impact could be enormous. striking a major American city could potentially disrupt supply lines, force defensive deployments in the Western Hemisphere and demonstrate that Germany possessed unprecedented technological reach.

In this sense, the America bomber was envisioned not only as a conventional weapon, but as a possible delivery platform for the ultimate strategic weapon, even though the technical realities of the time made such a mission impossible. Ultimately, the nuclear angle underscores how ambitious and forwardthinking the project was, but also how far Germany was from achieving a nuclear capable long-range bomber.

The combination of incomplete nuclear research, industrial limitations, and aircraft performance gaps meant that while the idea existed on paper, it remained a theoretical threat rather than a practical one. The America bomber at its most ambitious was not simply a bomber project. It was Germany’s attempt to imagine striking the American mainland with a weapon that did not yet exist and with a plane that could barely fly the distance safely.

Germany’s efforts to build a bomber capable of reaching the United States went further than many people realize. And for a time it seemed possible that the Luftvafa might produce a plane that could complete the transatlantic mission, at least in theory. Several prototypes were developed, tested, and flown, and each represented significant advances in German engineering.

Even though none of them ever became operational, the program included ambitious designs from Messmitt, Junas, Hankl, and Fauler Wolf. Each aiming to combine heavy bomb load capacity with endurance over an unprecedented distance. The Messid Messa 264 was the first prototype to take flight. It was a 4ine aircraft and it flew successfully in 1942.

Engineers had high hopes for the Messa 264 because it had an unusually large fuel capacity and a relatively light structure for its size. The first prototype Mi264 V1 conducted several test flights demonstrating that it could stay airborne for long periods and carry a significant load. However, the aircraft suffered from several problems.

Its climb rate was slow and maneuverability was limited. It was vulnerable to enemy fighters and could not carry enough fuel and bombs simultaneously to meet the full operational requirements. Production was extremely limited. Only a few prototypes were completed before the project lost priority to other wartime needs.

The Junker’s Julie Krauss 390 was another major contender. Based on the J290 design, it had six engines and a far greater overall size and load capacity than the Mech 264. Two prototypes were built and the aircraft was tested for long range performance. Engineers hoped it would be able to complete transatlantic missions with a full bomb load.

Reports suggest that the J390 flew some long range exercises and it may have approached the limits of endurance required for a strike on the United States. However, it remained a prototype, never entering production and operational testing was incomplete. Maintenance and reliability issues along with Germany’s shifting priorities prevented the J390 from moving beyond the experimental stage.

Other designs such as the Hankl H277 and the Fauler Wolf TAR 400 were even more ambitious. The H277 was a 4engine heavy bomber intended to carry substantial payloads over long distances, but production never started. Engineers worked on prototypes on paper and in workshops, but wartime disruptions, resource shortages, and constant air raids destroyed much of the infrastructure needed to build the aircraft.

The TAR 400 was planned as a six engine aircraft with variants using jet propulsion, but it never left the drawing board. Its specifications suggested that it could have carried enough fuel for extremely long missions, but the project remained a concept due to technological and material limitations. Across all these efforts, German engineers struggled with similar challenges.

Engines capable of sustained power for the required duration were difficult to produce reliably. Airframes had to be both strong and light, a combination that was hard to achieve given material shortages. Crew endurance was a constant concern.

Pilots and navigators faced the prospect of spending many hours in cramped, cold, and often unpressurized cockpits. Navigation across open ocean was another unsolved problem. Even the most advanced systems available at the time could not ensure precise positioning for the long flights required. Any error could lead to mission failure or the loss of the aircraft. Another major limiting factor was defensive capability.

The heavier the bomber, the slower and less maneuverable it became, and it would have been extremely vulnerable to interception. Germany could not provide a protective fighter escort over the entire ocean leg, which made missions highly risky. Adding defensive guns and armor increased weight, which in turn reduced range or payload. Every solution created a new compromise.

Despite these limitations, the prototypes proved that Germany could almost reach the goal in principle. Engineers had demonstrated that a large bomber could fly long distances while carrying significant payloads, and some test flights approached the endurance required for a transatlantic mission. However, the operational gap remained too large.

The aircraft were prototypes, not production models, and they were far from ready for combat. Fuel consumption, mechanical reliability, navigation accuracy, crew endurance, and defensive limitations combined to make an actual strike impossible. The timing of the program also worked against it. By 1943 and 1944, the Allied bombing campaign was intensifying, damaging factories and disrupting production lines.

Raw materials were scarce, engines were difficult to produce in sufficient numbers, and many engineers were reassigned to fighter and defensive projects. Hitler and the Luftvafer shifted priorities towards so-called wonder weapons and tactical operations that promised immediate results, leaving the America bomber program unfinished. In summary, Germany came surprisingly close in some technical respects.

Prototypes such as the May 264 and J390 demonstrated that engineers could design aircraft capable of extreme endurance and heavy payloads. They proved that in theory transatlantic bombing missions were possible, but in practice, no aircraft met all the operational requirements simultaneously. There were never enough prototypes built to conduct operational missions and the combination of industrial limits, technological gaps, defensive vulnerability, and shifting strategic priorities meant that the bomber program

remained experimental. While the dream of striking the United States captured imaginations, it was never realized and Germany’s closest approaches stayed on airfields, in flight tests, and on the drawing boards. Even so, the program remains one of the most ambitious strategic efforts of the Luftvafer during World War II.

It forced engineers to push boundaries in airframe design, fuel management, and long range navigation. It also highlights how strategic ambition can collide with operational reality. The prototypes, despite their limitations, represent a remarkable chapter in aviation history, showing that Germany came further than most people realized toward the capability to reach the American mainland.

Even if the final goal was never achieved, the Americans were aware of German longrange bomber research. But for most of the war, the full scope and ambition of the America bomber program remained unclear. US intelligence received fragmented reports through a combination of reconnaissance flights, intercepted communications, and information gathered from European sources, but they did not have a complete picture of Germany’s plans.

Analysts understood that the Luftvafa was experimenting with heavy aircraft and that prototypes such as the Mech 264 and J 390 existed, but the exact capabilities, range, and operational readiness of these planes were difficult to confirm. In other words, the Americans knew there was a potential threat, but could not determine whether it was real, imminent, or feasible. The US military and intelligence officers considered the possibility that Germany might attempt to strike the American mainland, especially after the entry of the United States into the war in late 1941. They were aware that German

engineers were theoretically capable of building very large bombers with long endurance. Reports described aircraft designs that could carry thousands of kilograms of bombs over extraordinary distances. While the Americans treated the threat seriously, they also understood the technological and industrial challenges Germany faced.

Analysts questioned whether Germany could produce enough engines, fuel, and airframes to actually execute a transatlantic mission. and they concluded that any attempt would be risky and likely limited to experimental flights or one-off operations rather than sustained campaigns. The reactions among American leaders varied.

Some viewed the America bomber program as a minor threat, believing that it would remain on paper or as untested prototypes. Others, particularly planners in the army air forces and strategic intelligence divisions, took the idea seriously, using it as an example to justify accelerating domestic long-range bomber projects and expanding homeland air defenses.

The United States increased focus on radar coverage along the eastern seabboard, coastal anti-aircraft installations, and fighter response plans. Even though an attack seemed unlikely, officials wanted to be prepared for the remote possibility that a German bomber could appear unexpectedly. US intelligence also closely monitored German technical journals, aircraft blueprints, and captured documents from occupied countries.

When prototypes like the MI264 and J390 were observed or rumored to exist, analysts debated their true capabilities. Some reports suggested these planes could fly across the Atlantic, while others warned that their payload or range would be far less than advertised. The uncertainty created a cautious but measured response. The Americans knew they had the industrial and technological capacity to respond to any direct threat, but they did not want to underestimate the Germans or ignore the potential psychological impact of a bomber reaching American cities. Interestingly, American engineers and

military planners were impressed by the ambition of the designs, even if they doubted operational practicality. The merely 264 with its four engines and large fuel tanks demonstrated that German engineers were capable of extreme endurance and advanced aerodynamics for the period.

The Jakoba 3090 with six engines and a massive wingspan represented one of the largest aircraft ever attempted in Germany. While these planes would never have reached operational status, their existence informed American assessments of German technical skill and provided insight into how the Luftvafer was thinking strategically.

Overall, the America bomber program contributed to American strategic planning in subtle ways. It reinforced the need for long-range bombers capable of striking Europe from the United States, influenced the design of radar and air defense networks along the east coast, and served as an example of the kind of threats that could exist, even if only on paper.

While the US never faced a direct attack, the knowledge that Germany had seriously considered targeting the American mainland shaped military thinking and reinforced the importance of maintaining technological superiority in aviation and intelligence gathering.

By the end of the war, the Americans fully realized that the threat had been far less immediate than some reports suggested. None of the prototypes had entered production. None were combat ready, and the logistical and technical challenges Germany faced made an actual attack impossible. Still, the Americans remembered the program as an extraordinary example of ambition and planning.

It showed that German engineers could imagine extreme long range capabilities and that even incomplete projects could influence enemy thinking. The America bomber became, in retrospect, a story of what might have been a mixture of technical daring and operational impracticality that the United States followed closely and used to prepare defenses that would never actually be tested. For most of the war, the America bomber program remained a secret.

The German Reich carefully guarded the designs, prototypes, and technical documents, and only a small circle of engineers, military planners, and top luftvafer officials knew the full scope of the project. Even Allied intelligence had only partial knowledge.

Reports of heavy bomber prototypes like the Maid 264 and JUF 390 filtered through reconnaissance flights and intercepted communications. But the program’s full ambition, creating an aircraft capable of reaching the American mainland with a heavy payload, was unknown to the wider world. It was only after the war ended in 1945 that the true scale of the project became widely known.

When Allied forces advanced into Germany, they captured prototypes, technical drawings, and secret documents stored in laboratories, hangers, and factories. Photographs of the MI264, JU 390, and other proposed aircraft were taken and shared among allied intelligence agencies.

Engineers and military officers who had worked on these projects were interrogated, and their testimonies provided detailed insights into the technical challenges and ambitious goals of the program. Soon after, newspapers, military journals, and history books began reporting the existence of the America bomber. Readers learned that Germany had seriously considered long-range bombers capable of striking New York, Washington, and other major American cities.

Many were surprised at the audacity of the plans, and discussions appeared in both public and classified intelligence reports about what might have happened if the aircraft had ever become operational. The reveal highlighted the lengths to which Germany had pushed engineering and strategic planning even as the country faced growing shortages and military setbacks.

The world also discovered the connection between the bomber program and Germany’s atomic research. Although Germany never built a functional nuclear weapon. The document suggested that the Luftvafa had considered using these bombers as delivery platforms if such a device became available. This revelation fueled postwar speculation and interest in what might have been, and it influenced both military historians and aviation engineers for decades afterward.

In the United States, the reveal reinforced the importance of developing long range strategic bombers like the B-29 Superfortress and maintaining homeland air defense systems. In Europe, the captured designs and technical data were studied extensively by the British Americans and later by the Soviets, many of whom used the lessons to inform postwar aircraft design.

The Mebby 264 and G390, while never operational, became examples of advanced aerodynamics, multi-engine configurations, and long range fuel planning that inspired future bomber concepts. By the 1950s and 1960s, books and documentaries made the America Bomber Project widely accessible to the public. Aviation enthusiasts, historians, and military planners began analyzing the project in detail, exploring the prototypes, the proposed missions, and the technical challenges. The reveal of the program gave the world a rare glimpse into the strategic

thinking and ambition of the Luftvafa at a time when it faced mounting pressures and challenges. In the end, the reveal to the world confirmed what German engineers and military planners had hoped, that their designs were technically impressive, daring, and forwardlooking.

Even though the planes never flew in combat, the post-war exposure of the America Bomber Project allowed historians, engineers, and the general public to appreciate the scope of German ambition during the war and to understand how close the country had come to imagining a strike against the United States.

It became a story of engineering skills, strategic vision, and ultimately limits imposed by war resources and time. Even though the America bomber never became operational, its legacy is significant in both aviation history and military strategy. The program demonstrated how far German engineers were willing to push technology and how ambitious wartime planning could become even under difficult conditions.

The designs of the MI264, U390, H277, and TAR 400 represented some of the most advanced concepts of their time, showing that engineers could imagine aircraft capable of flying extraordinary distances with heavy payloads. These prototypes and studies pushed knowledge in aerodynamics, fuel efficiency, engine performance, and long range navigation to new limits.

And much of this technical insight carried over into post-war aircraft design in both Europe and the United States. The America bomber also left a lasting mark on strategic thinking. Even though the planes never flew combat missions, the very idea that Germany could have reached the US mainland influenced Allied planners.

It reinforced the importance of early warning systems, coastal defenses, and the need for long-range bombers that could reach Europe from America. In the post-war period, the designs and technical notes captured by the Allies were studied extensively, and the lessons learned helped shape the next generation of strategic bombers, including jet powered aircraft.

Engineers examined how fuel distribution, engine reliability, and crew endurance had been approached and used these insights in the development of aircraft that were both faster and more capable than anything Germany had managed to produce. The legacy is also one of imagination and ambition.

The America Bomber program represents a vision of what might have been a bold plan to strike across oceans at a time when such ideas seemed impossible. While technical, industrial, and strategic realities prevented Germany from achieving this vision, the effort demonstrated the lengths to which nations will go when faced with global conflict.

It remains an example of pushing engineering limits under extreme pressure, of attempting something that no contemporary force had yet accomplished, and of the constant interplay between ambition and reality in military technology. Historians also point to the program as a case study in how wartime priorities shape innovation.

The resources, materials, and talent devoted to the America bomber could not be sustained alongside the production of fighters, tanks, and other essential weapons. In the end, strategic necessity and industrial capability determined what could be built, and the America bomber remained a prototype project rather than a fully realized weapon. This lesson has been echoed in military planning ever since.

Technical ability alone is not enough. Strategic timing, logistics, and production capacity are equally critical. Finally, the America bomber holds a place in public imagination as one of the what-ifs of World War II. Aviation enthusiasts, historians, and engineers have studied the prototypes, drawings, and documents to understand how close Germany came to developing a bomber capable of reaching America.

The MI 2064 and Joral 390 in particular are remembered as remarkable engineering achievements, and even today, they inspire discussion about the limits of technology, the ambition of wartime programs, and the intersection of imagination and reality in military history. In short, the America bomber did not change the outcome of the war, but its legacy endures through the knowledge it generated, the influence it had on postwar aircraft, and the way it captured the ambition and audacity of wartime German engineering.

It stands as a testament to what is possible when engineers are challenged to reach beyond the known limits. And it reminds us that even unfulfilled projects can leave a lasting mark on