What Eisenhower Said When George S. Patton Reached Bastogne First
December 26th, 1944. The phone rang at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. On the other end, General George S. Patton delivered four words that changed everything. We’re through to Bastonia. Eisenhower had been expecting this call, but not for another 3 or 4 days. Not through a blizzard. Not after the impossible 90° pivot everyone said couldn’t be done.
For once, Patton had actually kept his word and done the impossible. What Eisenhower said in that moment and in the hours that followed revealed everything about their complicated relationship, the turning point of the Battle of the Bulge, and what happens when genius delivers against all odds. This is the story of that phone call and the words that followed.
Words of relief, gratitude, frustration, and begrudging admiration. Let’s begin. December 19th, 1944. The emergency meeting at Verdon that would become legendary. German forces had smashed through American lines in the Arden, creating a massive bulge in Allied defenses. The 101st Airborne was surrounded at Bastonia, a critical road junction.
If Bastonia fell, German armor could potentially reach the coast and split Allied armies in two. Eisenhower convened his top commanders to coordinate response. The atmosphere was grim. This was the largest German offensive since 1940, catching Allied forces completely by surprise. Commanders reported chaos, disorganized retreats, and uncertainty about German objectives.
Then Eisenhower asked the critical question, “How soon can you attack north to relieve Bastonia?” Most generals hesitated, calculating logistics and troop movements. Then Patton spoke up on December 22nd with three divisions. The room went silent. Other commanders thought Patton was grandstanding again. To disengage three divisions from active combat in the SAR, rotate them 90°, move them over 100 m through winter conditions, and launch a coordinated attack in 48 hours.
It was operationally impossible. Eisenhower’s reaction was carefully controlled. He knew Patton’s reputation for making bold promises he couldn’t always keep, but he also knew Patton was his best hope. According to witnesses, Eisenhower leaned forward and spoke quietly but firmly. George, I want you to understand something.
The 101st Airborne is surrounded. If they’re overrun, it’s a catastrophe militarily and for American morale. When you say December 22nd, do you mean that or are you being optimistic? Patton met Eisenhower’s eyes. Ike, I’ve already done the planning. My staff has three contingency plans prepared. I anticipated this meeting before you called it.
On December 22nd, my fourth armored division will attack north toward Bastonia. I stake my career on it. Eisenhower considered this. Patton had actually prepared for this scenario before the Germans even attacked a level of foresight that even Eisenhower hadn’t expected. But could Patton actually execute? Eisenhower made his decision.
All right, George. You’ve got your chance. But understand, if you can’t deliver this, if those paratroopers are lost because you promised what you couldn’t achieve, there will be consequences. No more second chances. Patton nodded. I’ll be there, Ike. Count on it. After the meeting, Eisenhower pulled his chief of staff, General Walter Bedel Smith, aside.
Smith later recorded the conversation. The boss said he was taking a huge gamble on George. If Patton failed, both their careers might be over. But Ike believed, maybe for the first time, that George would actually follow through. The stakes were high enough that even Patton wouldn’t dare exaggerate.
Over the next 48 hours, Eisenhower received regular updates on Third Army’s movements. The reports were almost unbelievable. Patton’s forces were actually doing it, disengaging, moving north, positioning for attack. By December 21st, Eisenhower allowed himself cautious optimism. Patton might actually pull this off. December 26th, 1944, approxima
tely 4:45 p.m. Eisenhower was in his office at Chef headquarters in Versailles, reviewing situation reports from the Arden. The Battle of the Bulge was entering its second week. American forces had stabilized the Northern Shoulder, but the situation remained critical. Estonia was still surrounded, though the 101st Airborne continued holding. Then his phone rang.
the duty officer announced. General Patton calling from Luxembourg, sir. Eisenhower picked up immediately. George Ike, we’re through to Bastonia. The fourth armored made contact with the 101st at 1650 hours. The corridor is narrow, but it’s open. We’re pushing supplies through now. There was a pause. Multiple witnesses in Eisenhower’s office that afternoon recorded his reaction. First, visible relief.
His shoulders dropped, tension released. Then something unexpected. Eisenhower’s eyes became moist. He turned away from his staff for a moment, composing himself. George, say that again. You’re through. Confirmed. Ike. Captain William Dwight’s company from the 37th Tank Battalion made first contact. The paratroopers are battered, but holding.
We’re reinforcing the corridor now. Eisenhower’s voice when he spoke was thick with emotion. George, I congratulations. You did it. You actually did it. Then more firmly. How secure is the corridor? Patton’s response was characteristically confident. German counterattacks are hitting us, but we’re holding.
I’m pushing more units through. By tomorrow, Bastonia will be secure. After a brief tactical discussion, Eisenhower ended the call. He sat for a moment in silence, then turned to his staff. General Smith recorded Eisenhower’s exact words. Gentlemen, George Patton has just accomplished something I wasn’t sure was possible.
He promised December 22nd and he delivered December 26th. Given the weather and the conditions, that’s close enough to miraculous. Then Eisenhower did something his staff rarely saw. He smiled broadly and said, “Get me a message to the 101st. Tell them relief has arrived and send my personal congratulations to General Patton and Third Army.
They’ve just changed the entire complexion of this battle.” Within hours of Patton’s breakthrough, Eisenhower faced decisions about public messaging. The Battle of the Bulge had created panic in the United States. Newspapers speculated about German victory, potential Allied collapse, and whether American forces were capable of stopping the Vermacht.
Estonia’s relief was the first genuinely good news since the offensive began. Eisenhower’s public statement released on December 27th, was carefully crafted. Units of Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s third army have successfully broken through to relieve American forces surrounded at Bastonia. This operation executed under extremely difficult winter conditions and against determined enemy resistance demonstrates the fighting quality of American soldiers and the operational excellence of their commanders. The defenders of
Bastonia displayed extraordinary courage and determination. Their relief by Third Army forces marks a turning point in repelling the German offensive. The statement was diplomatic, praising both the 101st Airborne’s defense and third army’s relief operation. But those close to Eisenhower noted what he said privately was more revealing.
To British Field Marshall Montgomery, who was coordinating the northern response, Eisenhower wrote, “Patton’s performance in relieving Bastonia was exceptional. The speed with which he pivoted his army and launched a coordinated attack exceeded my expectations, and I suspect German expectations as well.” To General Bradley, Patton’s immediate superior, Eisenhower was more candid.
George delivered when it mattered most. Whatever frustrations I’ve had with his behavior and insubordination, this operation justifies my decision to keep him in command. He did what no other general could have done. But Eisenhower also sent a personal note to Patton, and this message revealed the complexity of their relationship.
George, congratulations on a brilliant operation, brilliantly executed. Your planning, your army’s execution, and your personal leadership made the difference. I am proud of what Third Army accomplished. However, I want to be clear. This does not erase previous issues or give license for future insubordination.
You’ve proven what you can do when you follow orders and work within the command structure. Continue doing that and there’s no limit to what you can achieve. The message was pure Eisenhower. Genuine praise combined with a reminder of boundaries. He wanted Patton to understand that success didn’t excuse everything.
In the days following Bastonia’s relief, Eisenhower’s diary entries and private letters revealed his complex feelings about Patton and the operation. These weren’t public statements for morale. They were honest reflections on command, leadership, and the burden of managing difficult subordinates. On December 28th, Eisenhower wrote to his wife, “Patton has done something remarkable.
I’ve spent so much time being frustrated with George, his ego, his controversies, his insubordination that I sometimes forget why I keep him in command. Bastonia reminded me when the stakes are highest. When the situation seems impossible, George delivers. I don’t know if any other general could have done what he did.
That’s simultaneously reassuring and concerning. Am I too dependent on one difficult man? To General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower was more analytical. The Bastonia operation demonstrates both the strengths and challenges of coalition command. Patton’s operational execution was flawless. Exactly the kind of aggressive mobile warfare we need.
However, his ability to anticipate this crisis and prepare contingency plans raises questions about how much autonomy subordinate commanders should have. Patton prepared for a German offensive that most of us didn’t see coming. He was right and we were wrong. How do we balance that foresight against the need for unified command? In his personal diary, Eisenhower was brutally honest.
George exhausts me. Managing him takes more energy than managing three normal commanders. But what he accomplished at Bastonia justified every frustration, every controversy, every moment I wanted to relieve him. The paratroopers at Bastonia owe their lives to George’s speed and aggression.
The Battle of the Bulge might have been a catastrophic defeat without his response. I can’t fire a man who saves battles. I can’t even reprimand him when he’s just proven his methods work. This is the impossible position George puts me in. He’s right too often for me to change him, but difficult too often for me to enjoy working with him.
Perhaps most tellingly, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “General Patton has demonstrated why despite his difficulties, he remains invaluable. His relief of Bastonia may have saved the entire Arden’s campaign. I wanted you to know this because I’m aware of concerns about patents temperament. Those concerns are valid.
But his operational capabilities are equally valid. And at this moment in the war, we need those capabilities more than we need easy personalities. The relief of Bastonia permanently changed how Eisenhower viewed and managed Patton. It established a new equilibrium in their relationship, one based on proven capability rather than potential, on demonstrated results rather than promised performance.
In January 1945, Eisenhower held a commander conference reviewing lessons from the Battle of the Bulge. When discussing Third Army’s performance, Eisenhower stated publicly, “General Patton’s relief of Bastonia represents one of the outstanding operational achievements of this war. The speed, coordination, and aggressiveness displayed by Third Army set a standard for mobile warfare.
Other commanders would do well to study this operation. This was significant. Eisenhower was essentially holding up Patton as a model, something he’d been reluctant to do given Patton’s controversies. But Bastonia had earned Patton that recognition, at least operationally. However, Eisenhower also made clear this didn’t mean unlimited license.
In a private meeting with Patton in February 1945, Eisenhower reportedly said, “George, Bastonia bought you credibility that will last the rest of this war. Don’t waste it. You’ve proven you can do the impossible when it matters. Now prove you can follow orders when they don’t suit your preferences. Be the general I know you can be.
The one who delivers miracles but also respects command structure. For the remainder of the European campaign, Eisenhower gave Patton more operational freedom than he gave other commanders. Third Army received ambitious objectives and the resources to achieve them with less micromanagement than before Bastonia.
Eisenhower had learned that Patton performed best when given clear objectives and room to maneuver. years after the war. In his memoir, Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower wrote, “General Patton’s relief of Bastonia vindicated my decision to retain him despite numerous controversies. His rapid movement of three divisions through terrible weather, his aggressive attack, and his breakthrough to the surrounded garrison demonstrated operational excellence at the highest level.
History will judge Patton by his battlefield achievements, and Bestow stands among his finest.” in private correspondence decades later. Eisenhower was more personal. George and I had a complicated relationship. He frustrated me constantly. But when I got that phone call on December 26th, 1944, hearing we’re through to Bastonia, I felt profound relief and gratitude.
In that moment, all the frustrations didn’t matter. George had saved those paratroopers and possibly saved the entire Ardan campaign. That’s what I remember most. Not the controversies, but the moment when he delivered exactly when it mattered most. The phone call that announced Bastonia’s relief was more than a tactical update.
It was vindication, validation, and the defining moment of the Eisenhower patent relationship. What Eisenhower said revealed admiration, relief, and the burden of commanding difficult genius. If this story of leadership, pressure, and impossible achievement resonated with you, subscribe for more untold moments from history’s greatest commanders.
News
ch2-ha-December 19th, 1944, a converted French army barracks in Verdun. The most powerful generals in the Allied command sat around a table, and not one of them was smiling. 3 days earlier, over 200,000 German soldiers had smashed through American lines in the Arden Forest. The offensive had caught Allied intelligence completely by surprise.
Why Patton Was the Only General Ready for the Battle of the Bulge December 19th, 1944, a converted French army…
ch2-ha-What Churchill Said When Patton Turned the Tide in North Africa
What Churchill Said When Patton Turned the Tide in North Africa March 1943, Churchill sat in his war room, studying…
ch2-ha-What Eisenhower Said When Patton Saved the 101st Airborne
What Eisenhower Said When Patton Saved the 101st Airborne If Patton didn’t move in time, the 101st Airborne would…
ch2-ha-What German High Command Said When Patton Turned His Army 90° in a Blizzard
What German High Command Said When Patton Turned His Army 90° in a Blizzard Impossible. Unmoglish. That was the word…
ch2-ha-How a US Sniper’s ‘Telephone Line Trick’ Killed 96 Germans and Saved His Brothers in Arms
How a US Sniper’s ‘Telephone Line Trick’ Killed 96 Germans and Saved His Brothers in Arms January 24th, 1945. Alzas….
ch2-ha-What German Soldiers Said When They First Fought Gurkhas
What German Soldiers Said When They First Fought Gurkhas Tunisia, March 1943. The darkness is absolute. Oberrighter Hunts Vber crouches…
End of content
No more pages to load






